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Abstract

Twenty years ago, James Q. Wilson and Patricia Rachal argued that government cannot regulate itself.

In an era ofrevivedfederalism, increased reliance on contractors, and proliferation ofquasi-public
organizations, the importance ofgovernmentself-regulation is greater than ever. Thispaper tests an
underlyng assumption of Wilson and Rachal's claim: that regulation ofpublic and private organizations
can be differentiated. Employing a meta-research design, thispilot study uses existing regulatorycase
studies to create "regulatory relationshipprofiles"forpublic and private organizations. These profiles
includeinformation on the structure ofthe regulator, the intentofregulation, the enforcement tools
available, the cultureofthe regulatoryrelationship and theinvolvement oftheJudiciaryin the regulatory

process. Although preliminaryfindings do not reveal dramatic differences in the regulatory relationship
profiles ofpublic andprivate organizations, the results dosuggest thatpublicorganizations have a
distinguishing culture and levelofjudicial involvement.

In a brief article entitled"Can the Government Regulate Itself?" James Q. Wilson and

Patricia Rachal claim that regulation of public institutions is more difficult than regulation of

private organizations (Wilson and Rachal 1977). Inthe years since the article's publication, the
effectiveness of intra-govemmental regulation has gained importance due to three developments

in American government: renewed federalism that has led the federal government to rely on state

and local government for program implementation (Donohue 1997), greater use ofprivate sector
contractors in place ofgovernment agencies (Kettl 1993), and creation ofhybrid organizations
that combine characteristics ofpublic and private organizations (Seidman and Gilmour 1986). All
three trends have increased the need for effective governmental regulation.

If Wilson and Rachal's claim is correct, the reliance on regulation to administer public

programs is troubling. Itsuggests that a"reinvented government" may consist oforganizations
beyond control - achallenge to democratic principles regarding popular sovereignty over public
policy (Krislov and Rosenbloom 1988).

Wilson and Rachal concede that they had not done the empirical work necessary to fiilly
substantiate their claim. Instead, their article draws upon examples to illustrate thedistinctive

challenges associated with regulating governmental organizations. They present the following four
obstacles to effective government self-regulation:

1 Can 7cut offfunds - The authors note that Medicare and Medicaid present "powerful
tools [the government] could use to control the behavior ofprivate hospitals (5). Since
no threat ofcuts to funding are relevant to the independently appropriated Veterans
Administration, no federal agency - in this case, presumably the Department ofHealth
and Human Services - can say anything regarding the operations ofVA hospitals.

Similarly, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) "finances itself... from retained
earnings and revenue bonds" and thus puts up strong resistance to interference (5).
2. Competinggoals —The TVA has apoorer record on environmental protection than
most private utilities. This is due to TVA's mission: provision ofinexpensive power to
poor Americans. Should the pollution problem be addressed at the expense ofsuch
citizens? Similarly, the Boston Housing Authority has an abysmal record on housing
code violations but points to its competing goals ofkeeping rents low and not passing
increases in operating costs on to tenants.

3. No means ofcontrol ~ Discussing the failures ofthe Office ofFederal Contracts

Compliance to improve government employment practices and use ofminority
contractors, Wilson and Rachal cite the lack ofcontrol over "the budget, personnel, or
structure ofany other agency" (12). With private companies, on the other hand, the

government can terminate contracts or go to court to compel compliance.
4. Mutual independence —Separate entities within the government are ill-suited to
"command" other entities. Each entity iscapable of political maneuvering and

"mobiliang allies elsewhere in government" toundermine adversaries. Also, courts
cannot resolve disputes between agencies because, "in the opinion ofmost constitutional
scholars, [that would] violate the doctrine ofthe separation ofpowers" (10).

Although these observations are plausible, some substantive problems exist. First, the notion that
federal agencies can simply "cut off' funds to offending private institutions is simplistic. Consider
Wilson and Rachal's example. HHS's option to withhold funds from hospitals is a blunt
instrument whose use is self-defeating and politically improbable. Donald Kettl's study ofsimilar

relationsWps between government agencies and contractors notes that government rarely enjoys

the ability to bark orders and expect compliance (Kettl 1993). Second, regulators of private

organizations routinely weigh competing public policy goals. Consider theFederal Aviation
Administration's difficulty in balancing safety regulation with airline industry promotion (Wald

1996). The Department of Transportation faces a similar challenge as fuel efficiency concerns
conflict vnth safety demands (Weidenbaum 1984).

Ofgreater concern, however, isthe authors'reliance upon a critical assumption. Wilson
and Rachal assume thatregulation of public and private institutions aredistinct phenomena. Yet

their examples refer only to public regulated institutions. The hypothesis that an "effectiveness"
gap separates the two types ofregulation is undermined iftwo types ofregulation are not
discernible. Wilson and Rachal present no evidence that private institutions are not equally, or

perhaps more, difficult toregulate than public institutions. Without such evidence, the most one
could possibly conclude is that government cannot regulate anyone oranything! While some may

agree with this contention, it is surely not what Wilson and Rachal intend to claim.

In this paper, I present apreliminary empirical investigation ofthe assumption that public

and private regulation are different. It is intended as astep toward more complete analysis ofthe
intriguing Wilson and Rachal claim. To facilitate acomparison ofcase studies ofregulation in
multiple policy spheres, I developed ameasure ofthe regulatory relationship. This is an attempt to
bring concreteness to the ambiguous discussion ofregulatory dynamics.
In addition to addressing the public/private distinction in regulation, this "pilot study"
serves as a modest test ofa meta-research approach that I describe in the following pages. That is,

this paper treats existing case studies as adata source. There is awealth ofinformation collected
by scholars ofpublic administration that lies generally untapped. I am working to develop an

approach for cumulative learning so that enjoyment ofthe fhiits ofour predecessors' labor is
maximized.

My research plan called for coding such case studies on crucial dimensions. I then search
for patterns that distinguish regulation ofpublic and private institutions. Acaveat isrequired:
there are clear threats to the validity of findings based on this approach. This study employs a
small number of cases. The cases were written by different authors, at different timeswith

different objectives. My coding ofthecases is undoubtedly subjective despite development of
guidelines to avoid this problem. Nevertheless, I believe thefindings aremeaningful and the
method is promising. It highlights salient issues, spans substantive areas and can beeasily
replicated to confirm findings.

"Institutional Status" as Indqtendent Variable

Discussions of regulation generally begin with the presumption thatthe regulator is

governmental and the regulated entity isa private individual or organization. Academic research
onregulation has demonstrated a similar orientation. Forexample, economists have sought to
demonstrate the costs of regulation for businesses in a host of areas fi^om steel production to

financial services (Kneese and Schultze 1975; Herring and Litan 1995). Political scientists have

questioned theability of private sector organizations to influence government regulators (Quirk
1981). Relatively few discussions of regulation consider regulated organizations inthepublic
sector.

Government agencies are among the most regulated institutions in the United iStates.
Federal agencies must adhere to a laundry list of rules thatgovern personnel practices,

contracting, public availability of information and even theprocedures for making additional

regulations. These are regulations that apply only to government agencies. Federal agencies are

also subject to many regulations that apply to private sector organizations: work safety rules, anti
discrimination rules, environmental protection rules and so on.

Hybrid organizations such as government corporations, government-sponsored enterprises

and other quasi-public entities are subject to federal regulations that define these institutions'

public mission. For example. Federal Home Loan Banks are required to devote aspecific
percentage oftheir earnings to affordable housing programs (Britt 1996). The demands on

regulation have grown as governments at the federal, state and local level have turned to hybrid
organizations to carry out public policy. Such organizations frequently do not rely upon

government appropriations to operate. Regulation is the only means available to keep them in line
r

with public policy objectives (Durant 1985). In short, hybrids require administration by regulation.
State and local governments confront similar webs ofregulation. Sub-national

governments in the United States must comply with ahost ofrules promulgated by federal
agencies. Many such rules apply to all organizations, public and private, such as the workplace

safety rules mentioned above but another major source ofrules are federal grant programs. The
federal government provides states with money to address policy needs ranging from

transportation to education to health care. Each grant is accompanied by rules and conditions that
govern the legitimate use offederal funds. The rules are the primary mechanism available to the
federal government to ensure that state governments are complying with the program's intent
(Kettl 1983).

The heart ofthe Wilson and Rachal argument is that regulation ofpublic institutions is

more difficult than regulation ofprivate organizations. In experimental terms, this hypothesis

provides aclear independent variable: the "institutional status" ofthe regulated institution. This

variable is implicitly dichotomous. All institutions with governmental connections would be in one
category: public institutions. All other regulated institutions are placed in the other category:
private institutions.

This strategy is adequate but a note of caution is required. Using "public institutions" to

encompass government agencies, local authorities, government-sponsored enterprises,
government-owned corporations and other institutional types glosses over distinctions based on
structure, funding, personnel and other characteristics. Variations within the category "public
institutions" may berelevant to the research question at hand. Paradoxically, the relevance ofthe
differences among public institutions cannot bedetermined before assessing the broader "public
versus private" question.

Thus inthe long run, a two-step strategy is necessary. The dichotomous approach to

categoriring subject institutions (public orprivate) will employed but reassessed in light ofthe
findings. At that time, sub-groups ofpublic institutions can beexamined to determine if, for

example, regulating government agencies isdifferent than regulating government corporations.

"Regulatory Relationship" as Dependent Variable

This paper does not directly address the hypothesis that government cannot regulate itself.
Thus the dependent variable isnot "regulate-ability" or some such concept. My objective isto
determine how, ifat all, regulation of public organizations differs from regulation of private
institutions. Unlike the independent variable, however, there is no dichotomous set of alternatives.
Nor is there an existing numerical scale created to measure regulatory responsiveness,
effectiveness or another general description of the regulatory dynamic.

To solve this measurement problem, I have identified a set of features based on a revdew

ofthe regulation literature in an effort to capture the character ofthe relationship between

regulator and regulated entity. The resulting composite profile, which I refer to as the regulatory
relationship profile, is the dependent variable of this study.

There are benefits to this approach. First, dividing the variable "regulatory relationship"

into component parts allows simple assignment ofcases to categories within sub-fields. For

example, enforcement is characterized as "penalty" or "incentive" based. Second, this mode of

analysis highlights salient sub-variables. For example, regulation ofpublic and private institutions

may be similar in every respect except the role ofthe judiciary. Such afinding points the direction
for future reseach.

Measures appropriate to each sub-field ofthe dependent variable must be derived. Each
measure need not be dichotomous. However, limiting the number ofpossible outcomes makes

coding cases and interpreting results much easier. The challenge ofspecifying the variables is to
achieve analytic functionality while maintaining conceptual coherence. What follows are brief

descriptions ofthe five characteristics utilized to measure the regulatory relationship, an

explanation oftheir inclusion in the relationship profile and the measures used for each subvariable.

1. Structure ofRegulation

Regulatory organizations take several different structural forms. Government departments
often regulate other agencies and private organizations. Some regulation is entrusted to

"independent" agencies that are not under direct, executive authority like other cabinet

departments. Regulatory functions are fi-equently assigned to commissions or boards that are

appointed by public officials, interest groups, citizen groups or some combination ofmethods.

There is reason to believe that such structural variation may be relevant to the efficacy of

regulation. Terry Moe noted that some regualtory agencies seem designed to fail (Moe 1987). If
one type ofregulator is associated with one type ofregulated institution, it is noteworthy.
Additionally, some regulators oversee numerous institutions while other regulators are

dedicated to oversight ofa single orlimited number ofinstitutions. It has been suggested that this
variation has bearing on the danger ofregulatory capture, a problem that inhibits regulatory

effectiveness (Meier 1985). Once again, the possibility ofcorrelation with the institutional status
of the regulated institution merits review.

This presents two areas ofpotential variation between public and private regulated
institutions and two measures in the "structure" sub-field ofthe regulatory relationship. First, I

will categorize the structure ofthe regulator in the broadest possible terms: department,

independent agency orcommission. Second, each regulated institution is coded "single" or
"multiple" based on the number ofother organizations overseen by that institution's regulator.
These shorthand measures may not be sufficient to identify smaller yet meaningful

variations such asthemethod by which regulators are appointmed. Still, measuring with broad
tools can establish whether certain regulatory structures areassociated vrith one class of regulated
institutions. The implications of more subtle variations can be studied inthefuture.
2. Intent ofRegulation

An intuitive theoretical explanation for the hypothesized difference between regulation of

public and private organizations is that there is a difference in the type ofregulations to which the
two classes oforganizations are subject. Inthis section, I describe two ways to differentiate types
of regulation.

a. Negative/Positive Regulation

Many instances of regulation are justified by a set of objectives that are essentially
"negative" in character. That is, the regulator is attempting to prevent the regulated institution

from performing harmful acts such as abuse of monopoly status, exploitation of social spillover

costs, charging of excessive rents, taking advantage ofa lack ofinformation, or some other

behavior deemed socially harmful (Breyer 1982). Although such"negative" regulation is

commonly associated withthe concept of regulation, other regulations are "positive" in character.
"Positive regulation" is intended to compel institutions to undertake some form of

beneficial activity. For example, financial institutions are subject to regulations that mandate
investment in underserved areas(Headand Hess 1987). Government-sponsored enterprises in the

housing sector arerequired to invest in low-income dwellings (Koppell 1997). Ingeneral, positive
regulation takesthe form of pre-set goals forvarious socially valuable goods.

It is possible that positive regulation ismore difficult than negative regulation. Thus if

public institutions are more frequently subject to positive regulation, public institutions may be
more difficult to regulate. This measure isnot dichotomous; the outcomes are not mutually
exclusive. Institutions can besubject to both positive and negative regulation. Thus there arethree

possible outcomes in this sub-field: each subject institution vnll be coded positive, negative or
both.

b. Procedural/Substantive Regulation

Asecond approach to differentiating types ofregulation is to distinguish procedural

regulation from substantive regulation. Regulations related to the policy mission ofan

organization —such as number ofhousing units permitted, permissible airplane noise levels.

acceptable automobile emissions ~ are referred to as "substantive." Such regulation relates to the
outputs of the regulated entity.

Procedural regulation, as the name suggests, is more concerned with process. Thus
requirements that paperwork befiled in a requisite format or that personnel be processed in a
certain mannerare categorized as "procedural."

Aswiththe negative/positive distinction, thisvariable is not dichotomous. Organizations

may be subject to procedural and substantive regulation. Also like the negative/positive
distinction, the salience ofthis variable relates to the ease of regulation. It may be more difficult to
enforce substantiveregulations than procedural regulations.
3. Enforcement of Regulation

There is a variety oftools available for regulatory enforcement. BarryMitnick has

described advantages and disadvantages of incentives and directives, effluent charges and
subsidies, auctions of pollution rights, financial penalties and legal sanctions (1980). Given the

vride variety of enforcement tools available to regulators, boiling this aspect of the regulatory

relationship down to limited number of measures is difficult. The most basic distinction generally
drawn bystudents of regulation isbetween "penalties" for non-compliance and "incentives" for
compliance. Likethe positive/negative measure utilized inthe "intent" field, these two measures
are not mutually exclusive. Regulators can utilize penalties and incentives to regulate a single
institution. Thus there are three possible outcomes.

Although there is no consensus as to which approach is optimal, it is important to include

this element of the regulatory relationship to evaluate the hypothesis thatregulation of public and

private institutions are different. The purpose of this measure is to determine whether of public

and private institutions are subject to different enforcement mechanisms. This "carrot or stick"
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Although there exists a spectrum on which the Swedish and American cases can be placed,
I have characterized the regulatory culture as cooperative or adversarial. An alternative approach
could utilize a numerical scale (say, 1 to 5) to reflect relative assessments of cooperation or

adversarialism in a regulatory relationship. This might add precision to the measurement but the

subjectivity of the assessmentwould be all the more obvious.
5. Judicialization of Regulation

Thefinal aspect of the regulatory relationship to be measured is the role of thejudiciary.

Kagan (1991), Melnick (1983), Wilson (1989), and Rabkin (1989) have argued that the
prominence of thejudiciary in American regulation distinguishes it from regulation inotherparts
ofthe world. From rule-making to enforcement, thejudiciary plays a significant role inthe

regulatory process. In comparing regulation of public and private institutions, then, it isnecessary
to include the role of the courtsas part of the profile of the regulatory relationship.
In areas as dissimilar as civil rights and auto safety, it has been suggested that the courts

have had a negative effect (McCann 1986; Mashaw and Harfst 1987). Regulations are reshaped to
conform with rulings. Agencies placate judges to avoid judicial interference. Regulated entities
turn to the courts to challenge unfavorable regulatory policies. Yet it has been suggested that the

judicial interference in intra-govemmental regulation is proscribed by constitutional separation of
powers (Melnick 1983; Atiyah and Summers 1987).

The consequences of such a barrier are unclear. Wilson and Rachal argue that the

separation of powers doctrine limits the ability ofcourts to mediate disputes between

governmental entities. But ifcourts do muddle the regulatory process, their absence might
actually improve regulatory efficiency. Before addressing this conflict, however, it isnecessary to
determine whether the judicial role in cases ofgovernment self-regulation isdifferent at all.
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analysis may not hold up to more rigorous inspection, but it is auseful starting point in this study.
Ifthis measure does not provide telling data, refinement - perhaps specification ofthe incentive
and/orpenalty employed - will be necessary.
4. Culture ofRegulation

Comparisons ofnational and regional differences in the relationships ofregulators and
regulated industries suggest another area for measurement. Intra-govemmental regulation may
have a distinctive culture or psychology that sets it apart from regulation of private organzations.
Several scholars have pointed outthedistinctive character of regulation inthe United

States. For example, Steven Kelman pointed out that the rules governing worker safety are similar
in Sweden in the United States yet regulatory practice is quite different (1981). Theculture of

regulation in Sweden is far more cooperative than in the American context. Regulators work with
regulated institution to find solutions to disagreements in Sweden while their American
counterparts are more inclined to penalize offenders immediately. David Vogel found
enwonmental regulation in the United States had a more adversarial character than in Britain

(1986). Joseph Badaracco had smilar findings in his study ofVinyl Chloride regulation in
industrialized countries (1985).

Cultural differences are not limited by international boundaries. Shover, Lynxwiler, et al.

observe regional variation in the enforcement ofthe Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(1984). Jerry Mashaw noted distinct differences in implementation ofAFDC regulations in
neighboring counties (1971). Cultural differences between countries, states, counties and cities
may bedue inpart to legal distinctions, economic variation, or other factors. Without
understanding ofsuch an underlying relationship, however, it ismost useful to characterize the
general culture of regulation.
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As with the"culture" variable, the prominence of the courts in any given regulatory

relationship could beplaced onsome spectrum between the most "active" judicial role in

regulation and the most "passive." Nevertheless, I have used the two endpoints to characterize the
judicialization ofregulation in any particular case. Once again, this simplification may prove
unsatisfactoryand require refinement.

Thus wehave a five-part regulatory relationship profile that includes information onthe

structure ofthe regulatory agency, the intent ofthe regulation, the enforcement mechanism utlized
by the regulator, the "culture" ofthe regulatory relationship and judicialization. the extent to
which courts are involved intheregulatory process. The appendix includes theregulatory

relationship profiles created using this five-part measuring device. These profiles ofthe interaction
between regulator and regulated institutions are based solely on the observations ofthe authors of
the case studies.

Additional items could have been incorporated into the relationship profile. It isimpossible

to know apriori what characteristics are most important. Structure, intent, enforcement, culture
and judicialization are elements ofthe regulatory relationship that appear critical. The extent to
which excluded information undermines the findings is an issue addressed inthe findings.

13

Findings
It cannot be stated strenuouslyenough that this paper is preliminaiy and based on a very

small number of cases. ^Despite this Grand-Canyon-sized caveat, there are findings that inform my
investigation of the public/private distinction. Additionally, this pilot study pro\ddes some insight
into the utility of such a research design.

Aninitial comparison of the regulatory relationship profiles for public and private

organizations do not reveal stark differences. Thefollowing table compares regulatory
relationship profiles of public and private organizations.
Table 1. Comparison of Relationship Profiles
Public

Private

Structure

Department
Independent Agency

50%

50%

38%

25%

Commission

13%

25%

Single
Multiple

25%

25%

63%

15yo

Intent
Positive

25%

13%

Negative

25%

50%

Both

38%

38%

n=16

Substantive

50%

63%

(8 public and
8 private organizations)

Procedural

13%

38%

Both

38%

0%

Enforcement
Incentive

13%

0%

Penalty

75%

75%

Culture

Cooperative

50%

25%

Adversarial

38%

63%

Active

50%

25%

Passive

50%

75%

Judiciaiiration

' One surprise that limited tlie scope ofthis project was tlie difficulty offinding coherent, quality case studies. This
is undoubtedly due, in part, toan academic culture that devalues such work.
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A. Interpreting Results No dominant profile for public or private regulated organizations

emerged in this study. Given the small number of cases involved, the only characteristics that
have marked variation are culture and judicialization. Although inconclusive, these findings

indicate some systematic differences between regulation ofpublic and private institutions. As for

the original Wilson and Rachal claim that government cannot regulate itself, the findings are
inconclusive and open to interpretation.

The differentiation on culture and judicialization variables can be assessed in two ways.

The cross-national comparisons ofregulation find more effective regulation in countries that are
less adversarial. Thus the cooperative culture associated with public institutions would suggest

more effective regulation ofpublic organizations. This is consistent with Kagan's observation that

public schools are more responsive to regulation than private schools (1986). On the other hand,
given the adversarial nature ofregulation in the United States, one could conclude that a

cooperative culture is merely asymptom ofregulatory capture. Thus public institutions are more
difficult to regulate. There is no easy escape from this loop. Itrequires more thorough
investigation of the actual cases.

The judicialization finding directly contradicts one ofthe points made in the Wilson and
Rachal article: that public organizations are immune to the judicial remedies used to compel

compliance by private regulated organizations. This study suggests that courts are more involved
in regulation ofpublic institutions than private organizations.

This finding is consistent with the observation that rights-based litigation has increased the
role ofthe courts in general (Sunstein 1990). It would not be surprising that intra-govemment

regulation would provide more opportunities for litigants to challenge the rulings ofregulatory

agencies; state action is aprimafacie justification for assertion ofarights claim. Ofcourse, this
15

raises concerns regarding the influence ofthe courts. Ifthe courts must act as super-regulator
over both regulator and regulated parties, the judiciary may be vested with too much authority
(Shapiro 1988).

B. Interpreting Non-Results What does not show up in thetable arethe variables that
were not included inthe regulatory relationship profile. These might have added insight into the

research question. One nominee for inclusion based on the case studies is"politicization." Insome
cases, the regulated institutions, public and private, seem to operate aggressively inthe political
system to secure favorable outcomes.

Wilson and Rachal cite this as an advantagefor publicregulated organizations. That

generalization seems false. Although government bureaucrats can beadept political actors
(Rourke 1984), private companies subject to regulation have also proven adept at applying

political pressure when faced with unsympathetic regulation (Quirk 1981). Indeed, private
organizations, given advantages infinancial resources and lack of constraints on political
activities, may be more effective in the political realm than many public organizations.

Unfortunately, developing a measure of such activity is daunting. Furthermore, many of the case
studiesdid not investigate this aspect of the regulatory relationship.

Undoubtedly, there are othercharacteristics that ought to be included in the regulatory

relationship profile. One ofthe goals in unveiling this research at such an early stage isto benefit
fi-om suggestions in developing a more complete model. This leads to some observations onthe
methodology.

C. Asgftssinp the Research Methodology This pilot study demonstrates both the promise
and inherent limitations of meta-research approaches. On the positive side, it was possible to draw

multiple cases into a single study. This allowed relatively quick assessment ofa broad hypothesis
16

without years of field research in a manner that can be easily replicated. Although one must be
cautious in drawing conclusions from the results, the findings do suggest areas offocus for future

research. Increasing the number of cases examined canonly improve the validity of the findings.
There are, however, disadvantages to this type of research. Using case studies written to
address one research question to assess a completely different question is a tricky business. First,

it requires extrapolation of observations from second-hand reports. Codingsuch cases is a
subjective process. Although I developed a guideline to ensure some level ofconsistency (see
Appendix), interpretation is unavoidable. The fact that this interpretation is layered upon an initial
round of interpretation is reason for some skepticism. Secxsnd, the writers of the case study may
not addressthe issues ofinterest. As the regulatory profiles reveal, some boxes remain emptyfor
lack of information.

An additional problem I had not anticipated was selection biasbythe casestudy authors.
Thisproblem is revealed bythe intent (substantive/procedural) variable. Although only a small
percentage of cases studies considered procedural regulation, it is quitecommon. Scholars may
focus on substantive regulation because it is easier to study or more intellectually stimulating than

proc^ural regulation. Nevertheless, thesample ofc^ses does not seem to reflect the population.
The implications of such bias are unclear. Other findings may beskewed asa result.
Despite these problems, this approach can lead to progress in public administration
research. I look forward to comments and suggestions that will improve this project and future

endeavors. Moreover, I hope that other students of political science experiment with similar

research strategies. This brief exercise demonstrates that 1) case studies remjun a valuable part of

political science research and 2)labor-intensive field research isnot incompatible with analysis of
interesting theoretical questions.
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Clean Air Act

(Koppell 1997)

HUD regulation of Federal
Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation

(Koppell 1997)

Assocaition

HUD regulation of Federal
National Mortgage

(Kagan 1986)

Public Schools

(Wolfe and NewMeyer 1985)

State (IL) regulation of
airports

(West 1986)

ADA on transit agencies

(Fine 1986)
DOT/DOJ enforcement of

oversight of School Board

SF School Conunission

(Durant 1985)

agency

independent

agency

independent

department

department

departments

commission

multiple

multiple

single

multiple

multiple

positive/
negative

positive/
negative

positive

negative

positive

procedural

substantive/

procedural

substantive/

procedural

substantive/

substantive

substantive

substnative

multiple

independent

EPA regulation of TVA for

single

substantive

positive/
negative

multiple

department

Boston Housing Authoritj'
(Nivola 1979)

agency

procedural

negative

Institution

Negative

Institution/

Substantive/
Procedural

Commission

Institution

Regulated

Multiple Regulated

Positive/

Intent

Department/
Independent
Agency/

Single Regulated

Structure

Regulatory Relationship Profiles: Public Organizations

penalty

penalty

incentive

penalty

penalty

cooperative

cooperative

cooperative

adversarial

cooperative

adversarial

penalty

Penalty

passive

passive

active

passive

active

active

passive

active

Adversarial

adversarial

Active/
Passive

Cooperative/

Incentive/

penalty

Judicialization

Culture

Enforcement

multiple

(Wolfe/NewMyer 1985))

Boeing planes

FAA certification of new

(Bedford 1969)

Civilian Aviation Board

Airline fare regualtion by

(GoflfandGoflfl9XX)

children's tele\'ision

FCC7FTC regulation of

(Noll 1983)

EPA regulation of coal
industry on SO2

(Northrup 1978)

OSHA regulation of cotton
industry

chemical industry
(Northrup 1978)

department

cortunission

commission

agency

independent

department

positive/
negative
positive/
negative

multiple

positive/
negative

positive

negative

single

single

multiple

multiple

substantive

substantive

substantive

substnative

procedural

penalty

penalty

penalty

penalty

procedural

negative

multiple

department

OSHA regulation of

P.63.

penalty

procedural

penalty

negative

substantive

cooperative

adversarial

adversarial

adversarial

mixed

adversarial

cooperative

adversarial

Adversarial

Penalty

multiple

negative

Active/

Cooperative/

Incentive/
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passive

active

passive

active

passive

passive

passive

passive

Passive

Judicialization

a>

Culture

V

Enforcement

department

agency

Institution

independent

Institution/

Commission

Procedural

Multiple Regulated

Substantive/

Positive/

Negative

Department/
Independent
Agency/

Single Regulated

Intent

OSHA regulation of
aerispace
(Northrup et al. 1978) *note
about go%t owned plant on

1994)

EPA regulation of steel
industry for CAA violations
(Lensk>', Roberts, Thomas

Institution

Regulated

Structure

Regulatory Relationship Profiles: Private Organizations

.it.
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